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The Incentive Problems with the  
All-or-Nothing Crowdfunding Model 
 
Garry A. Gabison* 
 
This paper discusses how the all-or-nothing model can disincentivize 
crowd investors to perform due diligence over the fraud or failure risks of a 
crowdfunding campaign.  Specifically, the major upside of this model is 
that a project cannot be funded without a critical mass investing.  If enough 
individuals in this critical mass of crowd investors perform their due 
diligence to check whether projects will become successful, then the model 
functions correctly; instead, this paper argues that this model incentivizes 
the crowd to produce noisy information that cannot be relied upon.  In the 
all-or-nothing model, sequential investments encourage rational investors 
to not perform their due diligence because they relied on the self-interest of 
prior investors to perform their own due diligence while non-fully rational 
investors may rely on the belief that prior investors have better information 
than they might gather.  Allowing campaigns to be overfunded can 
exacerbate some of the all-or-nothing model characteristics.  This paper 
concludes by discussing how the platforms, campaign creators, and crowd 
investors can be incentivized to better filter projects  in order to assure 
that crowdfunding fulfills its potential. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Crowdfunding is “a new and evolving method to raise money using 
the Internet.”1  For the purpose of this paper, crowdfunding means the 
process through which an individual or an entity raises funds using an 
 
 *  J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law and Ph.D. in Economics from Yale  
University. Research Fellow at the European Commission’s Joint Research Center Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies.  This paper was written with the financial support of the European 
Innovation Policies for the Digital Shift, a project jointly launched in 2013 by JRC-IPTS and DG 
CONNECT of the European Commission.  The content of this report does not reflect the official 
opinion of the European Commission. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the 
report lies entirely with the author.  All errors and opinions are my own.     
 1. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,430 n. 20 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 & 249).  The rules became final on Oct. 30, 2015.  See Press Release, SEC, 
SEC Adopts Rules to Permit Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
release/2015-249.html.  
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internet website, called a fundraising portal, from a large number of 
individuals, referred to as the crowd.2 
Crowdfunding comes in four varieties.3  Most of them use a model 
called the all-or-nothing model to fundraise through online portals:  the all-
or-nothing model specifies that a fundraising portal only disburse the funds 
to the fundraiser if the crowd's investment reaches or exceeds a 
preestablished threshold; otherwise, the portal returns their investment to 
the crowd. 
The all-or-nothing model has been used in various settings.  
Kickstarter, the most successful crowdfunding reward-based platform, uses 
this model.4  In 2012, the United States passed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).5  The JOBS Act puts in place measures to 
regulate equity crowdfunding with the goal to help startups raise funding.6  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) implements the JOBS 
Act and as part of this regulation, crowdfunding platforms must use the all-
or-nothing model.7 
This model owes its popularity to one major upside as compared to a 
 
 2. For a more in depth discussion of crowdfunding, see GARRY A. GABISON, JOINT RESEARCH 
CENTRE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UNDERSTANDING CROWDFUNDING AND ITS REGULATIONS (2015) 
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CROWDFUNDING], http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstre 
am/JRC92482/lbna26992enn.pdf; Garry A. Gabison, Equity Crowdfunding: All Regulated but Not 
Equal, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 359 (2015) [hereinafter Equity Crowdfunding]. 
 3. Contributors to donation based crowdfunding campaigns do not receive anything for their 
contributions.  Contributors to a reward based crowdfunding campaign receive some good or service in 
exchange for their contributions.  Contributors to a lending based crowdfunding campaign receive 
interest payments in exchange for financing a project.  Lending based crowdfunding is a form of micro-
lending, where contributors can select a project with an associated rate of return and maturation date.    
Contributors to equity based crowdfunding receive capital equity into a venture in exchange for their 
contributions.  C. Steven Bradford. Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws. 2012 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (2012). 
 4. “Funding on Kickstarter is all-or-nothing — projects must reach their funding goals to receive 
any money. All-or-nothing funding might seem scary, but it’s amazingly effective in creating 
momentum and rallying people around an idea.  To date, an impressive 44% of projects have reached 
their funding goals.”  Seven Things to Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter. 
com/hello (last visited Aug. 4, 2015).  
 5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter JOBS Act].  
 6. Equity crowdfunding is a form of crowdfunding where the investing crowd receives equity 
shares into a company in return for their investments.  The JOBS Act intends to “increase American job 
creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.”  Id.  The SEC “understand[s] that Title III was designed to help alleviate the funding gap 
and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and small businesses in connection with 
raising capital in relatively low dollar amounts.”  Crowdfunding, supra note 1 (quoting the 
Congressional debate).  
 7. “[T]his rule was designed to prevent fraud ‘either upon the person on whose behalf the 
distribution is being made or upon the customer to whom the payment is to be returned if the 
distribution is not completed.’”  Crowdfunding, supra note 1; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (2016) 
(“Transmission or Maintenance of Payments Received in Connection with Underwritings”).  The rules 
require that the offering specifies a minimum amount — the threshold — and may use as well as a 
maximum offering.   
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model where all funds are disbursed as they are raised (sometimes referred 
as a keep-it-all model): it is supposed to limit frauds.  The model does not 
stop fraud in and of itself; the model relies on individuals to perform their 
private-incentive-driven due diligence and catch fraud.8  Some users may 
of course free ride upon the due diligence of others.  Assuming that enough 
investors perform due diligence activities, fraudulent schemes should be 
detected; yet, some schemes get through these safety nets.  For instance, in 
2015, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) settled its first internet 
crowdfunding case9 where the fundraising individual never delivered and 
used the funds for personal reasons. 
Talks are underway in the U.S. Congress to extend the JOBS Act 
exemption even further.10  Policymakers may wish to reinvestigate the 
reliance on the all-or-nothing model to detect fraud and put in place other 
safeguards.  Such safeguards can ensure that some crowd members perform 
enough due diligence.  In Europe, for instance, Italian policymakers 
required that “at least 5% of the financial instruments offered are 
undersigned by professional investors or by banking foundations or by 
innovative start-up incubators.”11  The implicit assumption is that 
professional investors have sufficient private incentives to perform their 
due diligence because their livelihood depends on it and they also have 
sufficient expertise to filter projects.  In a sense, Italian regulators may not 
trust private individuals to perform due diligence. 
In this optic, this paper questions whether the all-or-nothing model 
should be trusted on its own.  The analysis in this paper is based upon the 
idea that if a crowdfunding campaign turns out to be a fraudulent scheme, it 
will not be privately efficient to rectify: The cost of privately suing 
outweighs the benefits because each individual suffers a small injury but 
the litigation costs are large.  While the argument often focuses on 
fraudulent schemes, it can be extended to projects that cannot (blatantly) be 
completed.12 
 
 8. “Read what others say.  If you’re not sure about something, you can look elsewhere on the 
web.  Does the creator have an online presence, or past work you can look at?  Do people say good 
things about them?  If you’re curious about the thing they’re creating, you can look into that, too.  Has it 
been tried before?  What happened then?” Trust & Safety, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter. 
com/trust (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).  
 9. Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.T.C. Reaches Settlement in a Kickstarter Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 
2015, at B2. 
 10. Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Frustration Rises Over Crowdfunding Rules¸ WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
30, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579532251627 
028512.  
 11. CONSOB Regolamento n. 18592/2013, art. 24 (June 26, 2013) (It.). 
 12. This paper does not argue that all crowdfunding projects must succeed; instead, some projects 
are recklessly funded.  “Recklessly funded” occurs when a rational individual who perform a reasonable 
due diligence would not have invested his own funds into the projects because it reasonably believes or 
expects that the project is more likely to fail than succeed.  
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This paper first deconstructs the all-or-nothing model from all three 
sides: the platform’s incentives to investigate, the campaign creator’s 
incentives to provide information, and the crowd’s incentives to invest 
optimally.  Second, this paper discusses how overfunding encourages 
herding which leads to two problems: The investing crowd has little 
incentive to check a project; and too few projects get funded.  The former 
problem is, however, the main concern of this paper.  Allowing campaign 
creators to overfund hides information from the crowd, and even if the 
crowd were fully rational, they would not be able to make an educated 
investment.  In other words, overfunding combined with the all-or-nothing 
model distorts incentives further.  Finally, this paper discusses how liability 
and regulations have attempted to redress some distorted incentives.  
Reward based platforms do not carry much liability; hence, they have little 
incentive to filter projects.  Increasing liability of campaign creators can 
have an impact on their behavior but they may respond more to disclosure 
requirements that require them to signal their past performance in order to 
approximate their future intent.  Finally, to realign the incentives of the 
crowd may require platforms and policymakers to work together and 
become innovative: Paternalistic regulation such as capping the investment 
level may not be sufficient; behavioral economics suggest some ways to 
encourage more due diligence. 
 
II.  THE ALL-OR-NOTHING MODEL DISTORTS INCENTIVES TO 
INVESTIGATE 
 
Crowdfunding involves three participants: the crowdfunding platform, 
the campaign creator, and the crowd.  This section looks at each participant 
and how the all-or-nothing model affects their behavior and may 
incentivize these participants to make crowdfunding less socially optimal 
than it can be. 
 
A.  THE PLATFORM’S INCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATE 
 
Platforms have a private incentive to ensure that they do not attract 
bad, failing, and fraudulent products (e.g., pyramid schemes).  If they do 
not filter for these projects, their reputation and their goodwill would be 
harmed.  More importantly, their service would become unwanted and the 
platform would, itself, fail.  Approaches differ greatly from platform to 
platform to ensure that they properly filter projects.  These approaches can 
be divided in two: preemptive due diligence and retroactive actions. 
On the one hand, pre-emptive due diligence requires more 
participation from the platform because it requires that the platform check 
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all projects.  Therefore, platforms will use this technique if their service 
attracts a large number of problematic projects.  The larger cost associated 
with performing a due diligence for all projects must also be passed onto 
both type of portal users (fundraisers and investors). 
Some platforms perform a due diligence and filter campaigns before 
posting them on their portal.  For instance, WiSeed, a French based equity 
crowdfunding platform, performs an initial review, proposes the selected 
projects to the crowd to vote along eleven criteria, and finally the platform 
performs a due diligence before allowing the crowd to invest.13 
This triple-layered filter may not be enough to protect the crowd from 
unsuccessful projects.  WiSeed states risk capital such as equity 
crowdfunding involves risks by definition and states that out of every ten 
companies, investors should expect that three will be written off, two will 
break even, and the remaining five may bring back enough capital to lead 
to profits.14  Since its creation in 2008, WiSeed has helped finance seventy-
six companies for almost thirty million euros:15 They recorded, as of mid-
2015, five negative exits to one positive exit; the rest of the investment 
remained un-exited.  Even with a three-layer filter,16 the current successful 
exit rate is low, much lower than what WiSeed predicts. 
Besides protecting their goodwill, certain platforms have aligned their 
own private incentives with performing exhaustive due diligences.  For 
instance, some equity based crowdfunding platforms perform extensive due 
diligence because they earn more when projects succeed and the crowd 
earns more.  Seedrs, a U.K. based equity crowdfunding platform, profits 
only if the crowd profits because their fee is linked to the profits that 
investors make upon reselling their shares.17  As such, the platform has a 
 
 13. GUIDE ENTREPRENEUR, WISEED, https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/wiseed-public-fr/med 
iatheque/guide_entrepreneurs.pdf.  
 14. Christine Lejoux, Wiseed, ou Quand les Particuliers Investissent le Capital-Risque, LA 
TRIBUNE (Aug. 1, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/wiseed-ou-quand-les-p 
articuliers-investissent-le-capital-risque-495249.html. 
 15. Startups Funded per Year, WISEED, https://www.wiseed.com/en/startups/equity-crowdfund 
ing (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).  
 16. In 2014, around one thousand companies submitted to WiSEED to start a campaign and from 
these thousand, thirteen were financed and with a ninety-four percent success rate.  Christelle Lefebvre, 
Wiseed: “Un Assouplissement Fiscal Positif Pour les Start-Ups,” NICE MATIN (Jan. 22, 2015, 10:59 
AM), http://www.nicematin.com/le-club-eco/wiseed-un-assouplissement-fiscal-positif-pour-les-start-
ups. 2075105.html (“Wiseed voit arriver 1000 projets par an, elle en a financé 13 en 2014 avec un taux 
de réussite des souscriptions de 94%.”).  In 2014, among these one thousand projects, two hundred 
projects were submitted to e-vote and fifty went to due diligence.  Wiseed, EDUBANQUE.COM, 
http://www.edubanque. com/entreprendre/crowdfunding/annuaire-du-crowdfunding/wiseed.html (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2015) (“200 projets passés en e-vote, 50 projets passés en due-diligence”).  
 17. For instance, Seedrs “only charge[s] a single, straightforward fee of 7.5% on any profit that 
you make on an investment held by us as nominee.”  Frequently Asked Questions, SEEDRS, 
https://learn.seedrs.com/faqs/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2016).  Seedrs creates a holding to hold the shares 
brought by the crowd and collects the 7.5% when a contributor sells its shares.   
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strong incentive to perform preemptive due diligence. 
Arguably, some platforms perform so much due diligence that they 
provide few incentives for other crowdfunding participant to perform their 
own.18  For WiSeed, the filtering may have disincentivized other forms of 
due diligence since almost all projects that make it through these filters are 
financed;19 hence, the weeding out promised by the all-or-nothing model 
may not work after all or even become almost redundant. 
Preemptive due diligence is not adequate for all platform types.  
Equity crowdfunding platforms can perform this kind of due diligence 
because they receive relatively fewer projects.20  Reward based 
crowdfunding, however, has opted for a more reactive approach because of 
the large volume of projects they receive: checking each project would 
require larger costs that would be then passed on to platform users; thus, to 
keep cost low, such platforms may prefer not to perform preemptive due 
diligence and, instead, may prefer to act after the fact. 
Proactive due diligence occurs after the projects have been publically 
posted and even received some investments.  As such, proactive due 
diligence relies on the crowd to flag problematic projects.  In other words, 
it exploits the all-or-nothing model attributes more than preemptive due 
diligence. 
For instance, Kickstarter receives thousands of projects and it has 
helped to successfully finance over 22,000 projects with success rates 
varying between thirty-four percent and seventy percent depending on the 
category or industry.21  Kickstarter acts after the crowd flags a project as 
problematic.22  In other words, Kickstarter relies on the crowd to perform 
its due diligence.  Once, a project is flagged, the platform investigates this 
problematic project; if the platform's due diligence discovers problems with 
 
 18. “The crowd’s decision on whether or not to support a crowdfunding campaign is very much 
based on emotion and as such, the time spent by a potential backer in reading the details of a 
crowdfunding campaign and subsequently deciding whether or not to contribute is only a matter of a 
few minutes. Surprisingly, this also holds true for crowdinvesting.”  SPACETEC CAPITAL PARTNERS 
GMBH, CROWDFUNDING INNOVATIVE VENTURES IN EUROPE: THE FINANCIAL ECOSYSTEM AND 
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE (2014).  Behavioral economists have also observed this “intuitive” decision-
making and investment in other contexts.  See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (discussing the literature on 
decision making). 
 19. See Startups Funded per Year, supra note 15.  
 20. Also as licensed financial analyst, they have a duty to perform some due diligence, particularly 
if they are considered the agent of investors.  See, e.g., Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 388.  
 21. Stephen Heyman, Keeping up with Kickstarter, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.ny 
times.com/2015/01/15/arts/international/keeping-up-with-kickstarter.html. 
 22. For instance, Kickstarter cancelled a crowdfunding campaign that showed potential signs of 
fraud during the campaign, after eighty percent of the threshold was already reached.  Kickstarter Pulls 
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the projects, the platform removes the project and refunds the invested 
funds. 
 
Preemptive actions take the onus away from the crowd to perform due 
diligence, whereas pro-active measures rely on the crowd to play a central 
role in filtering out unviable and/or fraudulent schemes.  Exploiting the all-
or-nothing model disincentivizes platforms to perform its own due 
diligence on every project, and instead, platforms perform due diligence 
only on flagged projects. 
Note that even the platforms that perform their own diligence, like 
WiSeed, still rely on the crowd.  While this reliance may help filter projects 
on which the crowd has better information, it may well be more reflective 
of filtering projects that some crowd members will not like and support.  In 
other words, the platform relies on the crowd to filter projects in which 
performing due diligence would constitute a waste of resources for 
commercial reasons, instead of reasons linked to project inherent defects. 
The next section investigates how the all-or-nothing model 
incentivizes campaign creators to disclose valuable information. 
 
B.  THE CAMPAIGN CREATOR’S INCENTIVES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION 
 
Campaign creators have an incentive to reveal information because 
they want to secure investment.  Campaign creators compete with other 
campaigners for the crowd's (limited) funds.  In order to distinguish their 
project from others, they have an incentive to disclose positive information: 
they have incentive to signal that they project will succeed. 
The all-or-nothing model seems to encourage them to provide even 
more details and present the information at a lower reading level23 as 
compared to the keep-it-all model.24  Since they need to convince the crowd 
to invest beyond a certain threshold, campaign creators are incentivized to 
provide more information than under the keep-it-all model.  With more 
information, the crowd should be able to make better decisions and be able 
to detect issues. 
More information may not always help investors; instead, higher 
quality information should be the focus.25  Campaign creators perform a 
 
 23. Douglas J. Cumming et al., Crowdfunding Models: Keep-it-All vs. All-or-Nothing (Working 
Paper, May 31, 2015, version) (using data from Indiegogo, which lets the campaign create elects 
between a keep-it-all and all-or-nothing model, and finding a correlation between the all-or-nothing 
model and more information such as a longer and easier to read project description with more pictures 
and video pitches).  
 24. The keep-it-all model is one where the fundraiser keeps any funds that he or she raises through 
the crowdfunding campaign period. 
 25. Jan Barton & Gregory Waymire, Investor Protection Under Unregulated Financial Reporting, 
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cost benefit analysis in order to decide what information to disclose.  As 
such, a campaign creator will only disclose information that he or she 
believes increases the probability of securing financing; and he or she will 
hide information that would hurt its chance of success. 
Some information, such as an audited financial statements, is 
expensive to produce and producing this information does not guarantee 
that the campaign will succeed.  Nonetheless, it helps campaign creators 
send a strong signal about the belief he has in his project. 
With crowdfunding, the costs usually outweigh the benefits because 
investors are numerous enough that they need not convince every investor, 
but only a small portion.  Traditional investment mechanisms, such as loans 
from banks, or investments from business angel or venture capital 
investors, usually involves only a few players; hence, fund-seekers need to 
send a strong signal to convince even one of these few players.  With 
crowdfunding, fund-seekers need only to convince a small fraction of a 
large group. 
Therefore, campaign creators do not usually disclose costly 
information unless prompted.26  While none of the equity crowdfunding 
regulations in Europe requires that the campaign creators disclose such 
information, the U.S. regulations have a disclosure requirement, which 
varies depending on the threshold sought.27  U.S. policymakers have 
recognized that the incentives created by the all-or-nothing model were not 
sufficient to encourage fundraisers to disclose valuable information. 
 
C.  THE CROWD BEARS THE BRUNT OF THE DUE DILIGENCE 
 
Some platforms rely on the crowd to perform its due diligence.  Some 
have questioned the wisdom of the crowd, stating that it rests upon faulty 
assumptions.28  The crowd has generally three options when participating in 
crowdfunding: an individual can research a project, generate information, 
 
38 J. ACCT. & ECON. 65, 39 (2004) (empirically finding that companies which reported higher quality 
information experience lower smaller losses during the 1929 crash). 
 26. Barton & Waymire, supra note 25, at 4 (empirically finding “that managers select financial 
reporting quality by factoring in investor demand for information”). 
 27. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389. 
 28. Zachary J. Griffin, Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses, 4 CASE W. RES. J. L. TECH. 
& INTERNET 375, 402 (2013) (arguing that the wisdom of the crowd relies on three assumptions:  
“1) that someone will uncover fraudulent information in business plans; 2) that those same individuals 
will post the ‘truth’ on the Internet; and 3) that crowdfunding investors will see and read the posts about 
fraudulent business plans.  If any one of these assumptions fails, the whole ‘wisdom of the crowds’ 
theory collapses.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the Crowdfunding 
Era: Disclosing To and For the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 847–48 (2014) (discussing the wisdom 
and the madness of the crowd and argue that governmental mandated disclosure may be useless 
depending on the predominant behaviors of the crowd (decentralized, independent, and diverse)). 
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and add to the crowdfunding project experience; or an individual can 
consume the information created by others and follow their  
recommendations; or an individual can do neither, but still choose between 
participating or not.29 
The first type of individual is difficult to believe.  If an individual 
generates information, he must expend time and potentially resources to do 
so.  After generating that information, he can either keep it to himself or 
share it with other members of the crowd.  If a crowd participant invests in 
a project, he has incentives to promote the project whereas if a crowd 
participant believes a project is a fraud (or simply bad), he has little private 
incentive to spend more time and resources to flag it as such.  In other 
words, positive disclosures may be difficult to interpret; negative 
disclosures are not as frequent as they should be and when they occur, they 
might be motivated by other reasons.  In the end, each member of the 
crowd may have to rely on their own due diligence, which almost defeats 
the idea behind the crowd and the all-or-nothing model. 
For the crowd to function as a project filter, the same individual needs 
to promote good projects and detract bad projects in order for their signal to 
become trustworthy; otherwise, the information produced may be difficult 
to trust and to distinguish from noise.  Arguably, other mechanisms 
incentivize information sharing in this setting.  For instance, an individual 
can be rewarded for sharing his knowledge about a bad project through 
enhanced reputation. 
One study finds that if individuals have private incentives to promote 
a campaign, they may encourage riskier projects.30  They found that some 
crowd members may strategically invest in order to induce others to invest 
because investing seems to be the clearest endorsement message.  In other 
words, it should not be surprising that if a campaign is a fraud, crowd 
members participating in the scheme might induce others to invest. 
The second type of individual may misinterpret the important 
information.  If an individual consumes information, he expends fewer 
resources.  Even if all the information is valuable, the marginal benefit of 
consuming additional information decreases; hence, the consumers may 
focus on the most obvious information without digging deep.31  
 
 29. See, e.g., Ilan Kremer et al., Implementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd,” 122 J. POL. ECON. 988 
(2014) (providing a modelization of the interaction of three participation options). 
 30. Thomas Hildebrand et al., Adverse Incentives in Crowdfunding (Working Paper, Feb. 20, 
2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1615483 (finding that in loan-based crowdfunding, rewards have 
created adverse incentives for group leaders to promote risky loans with higher default rates while other 
crowd members are not aware of this incentive and follow the leader in their investment). 
 31. See, e.g., Scott Counts & Kristie Fisher, Taking it All in? Visual Attention in Microblog 
Consumption, 11 INT’L AAAI CONF. ON WEBLOGS & SOC. MEDIA 97 (2011) (discussing the limited 
attention of consumers and the information characteristics that trigger consumers’ actions). 
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Furthermore, the consumers may struggle to seperate valuable information 
from noise; hence, they may struggle to decide in which project to invest to 
maximize their welfare. 
One study found that initial investors are usually the ones in 
geographical proximity of a project, i.e., they are able to physically verify 
the project.32  Considering that location does not affect the information 
consumption costs, the underlying conclusion is that information 
consumers (i.e., follow-up investors) base their investment decisions on the 
judgment of investors who are closely located to the project creator.33  
Since investing is the strongest message, and location permits better fraud 
detection, information consumers wait for people who can observe the 
campaign creator to invest before investing themselves. 
However, trusting people based on their physical closeness to the 
individual fundraising can be problematic because those same people 
maybe the ones promoting a bad or fraudulent scheme.  Family and friends, 
who might provide the seed money for a crowdfunding campaign, may 
strategically bid and endorse a project or endorse a project for other reasons 
other than their own benefits.34 
The third type of individual may misguide other investors.  If an 
individual does not produce or consume information, he expends no 
resources.  Instead, he or she invests based on “hunches” and the 
information provided to him by the campaign creator or platform.35  
Relying on hunches is an option with crowdfunding because he or she may 
invest small amounts and diversify his or her risks such that it may not be 
either privately optimal to generate or consume information.  Investors may 
not even learn from their mistake since most do not repeatedly invest over a 
year.36 
 
 32. Ajay Agrawal et al., Offline Relationships, Distance, and the Internet: The Geography of 
Crowdfunding (Working Paper, Mar. 10, 2011), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~atakos/ResearchCamp/ 
agoldfarbpaper.pdf. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Family and friends may consider the wellbeing of the fundraiser when they assess their own 
benefits.  For instance, a parent may invest into the project of a child not because they believe that their 
invest will turn into profits but because their child receives a head start that can help them accomplish 
their ultimate goal and happiness: parent’s wellbeing is dependent on their child’s wellbeing. 
 35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 36. See The Best of 2012, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2012 (last visited Mar. 
13, 2016) (claiming that of its 2.2 million people who backed projects in 2012, only 570,672 backed 
two or more); 13: The Year in Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/year/2013 (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016) (claiming that in 2013 Kickstarter had three million people pledge, of which  
“807,733 backed more than one project.”); The Year in Kickstarter 2014, KICKSTARTER BLOG, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2014 (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (claiming that in 2014, 3.3 million 
people backed a Kickstarter project, of which “773,824 people backed more than one project”).  Hence 
about 74% of backers back only one project in 2012, seventy-one percent in 2013, and seventy-seven 
percent in 2014.  These numbers do not account for individuals who come back from year to year and 
who may be learning by doing; but it also highlights that the majority of individuals are attracted to 
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This investor type is problematic because by investing, they are 
generating information for subsequent investors.37  Since information 
consumers may not wish to rely on this cheap talk provided by information 
generators, they may focus their attention on the number of committed 
investors and the commitment level.  Since the last kind of investors invest 
without due diligence,38 they can induce others to invest without filtering 
projects through other means. 
The crowd will be composed of all three types of individuals.  If 
noninformation generators and consumer investors dominate the crowd, 
free riding becomes problematic.39  These investor types rely on other 
investors’ private incentives to perform due diligence and check the project 
in depth. 
The all-or-nothing model can disturb the order between information 
gatherers and consumers.  In this model, even if non-information generator 
and consumer investors are the first to invest, they can free ride on future 
actions.  These investor types know that in order to be funded, a project 
needs to gather a critical mass in order for the funds to be disbursed; hence, 
they may invest under the assumption that later investors will perform their 
due diligence and sufficient investors will perform such analysis within the 
 
specific projects. 
 37. Empirical studies have found that the amount invested provides incentive for others to invest 
whereas the number of investors may provide a disincentive to invest.  Professors Juanjuan Zhang and 
Peng Liu also found that crowd-lender in an all-or-nothing model take in consideration the investment 
behavior of previous investors before investing: investors are more likely to bid if they observe that the 
amount invested is larger and the percent left to reach the threshold is smaller; however, the higher the 
number of investors observed the less likelihood individuals are to invest because “as decision-makers 
imitate their predecessors, their own choices become less diagnostic of quality.”  Juanjuan Zhang & 
Peng Liu, Rational Herding in Microloan Markets, 58 MGMT. SCI. 892 (2012).  In Crowdfunding 
Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2234765 (2014), Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus performed a similar 
analysis.  They focused on the number of investors.  They found that the ratio of the cumulative number 
of backers supporting a project to the total number of backers required to reach project’s goal impacts 
the likelihood of receiving new investments.  In reward based crowdfunding, the daily additional 
average number of investors does not linearly increase over time; instead, it follows a “U” shape: it 
decreases at first to increase in the later stages of the campaign; once fully funded, this number slowly 
decreases again. 
 38. See Wenjing Duan et al., Informational Cascades and Software Adoption on the Internet: An 
Empirical Investigation, 33 MISS. Q. 23 (2009) (finding that online communities can exhibit this 
behavior where the crowd follows the behavior the adoption decision of predecessor without actively 
consuming and processing information to make that decision and that crowds when adopting software 
follow the cascade theory: User reviews have no impact on the adoption of popular product whereas 
they have an impact on less popular product). 
 39. Hendrik Hakenes & Friederike Schlegel, Exploiting the Financial Wisdom of the Crowd — 
Crowdfunding as a Tool to Aggregate Vague Information (Working Paper, Aug. 1, 2014 version), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2475025 (modeling the crowdfunding investment mechanism in a loan-
based crowdfunding setting and shows that some investors have no incentive to gather information in an 
all-or-nothing model and instead “may still want to make a pledge, trying to free-ride on the 
information provided by the informed households”). 
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required critical mass.40  In the process, they generate information for 
subsequent investors as well. 
In general, the all-or-nothing model leads to only a few individuals 
carrying out some form of due diligence and too much free riding.  Without 
a critical mass performing due diligence, the all-or-nothing crowdfunding 
model fails to ensure that the crowd will not lose their investment through 
fraud or bad projects. 
The lack of due diligence is exacerbated in the equity all-or-nothing 
model because investors will rely on the platforms to perform their own 
due diligence  particularly if the platform's fee is attached to investment 
performance.  In other words, the all-or-nothing model may encourage the 
crowd not to be wise, but instead to follow each other. 
To counter some of these issues, the Italian regulations have required 
that at least five percent of the invested funds come from sophisticated 
investors.  The logic being that at least five percent of the investment will 
come from individuals who will perform a due diligence: Sophisticated 
investors have the expertise to understand business planning.  They make a 
living out of investing; hence, they have a strong private incentive to 
perform due diligence. 
This logic, however, may not function and these sophisticated 
investors may not provide this safety net.  Nonprofessionals may invest 
based upon the knowledge that professional investors will perform their 
due diligence:41 they rely, once more, on the necessary critical mass of the 
all-or-nothing model.  In other words, this rule may induce even more 
investment than without it. 
Sophisticated investors may also take more risk than they would 
otherwise because of the small relative amount invested and their capacity 
to diversify.  For instance, in 2014, Stars Up, an Italian based 
crowdfunding platform, helped raise funds for its first project, Cantiere 
Savona, a start-up that produces solar-motor boats.42  It raised €380,000 
from forty-four investors or about €8,600 per investor; however, it took 
eight business days between reaching the fund threshold and achieving the 
requisite five-percent-from-professional-investor threshold.43  In this 
 
 40. “[T]he sequential nature of investment has the potential of triggering an information cascade. 
 This path dependence suggests that funding success will only reflect underlying project quality if early 
funders do a careful job screening projects.”  Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of 
Crowdfunding, in INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON. 63 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 14th ed. 2014). 
 41. Crowdfunding opened investing to potential investors without the same kind of expertise. 
 Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 386–99 (discussing in more details the different definition of a 
sophisticated investors and the different relaxation of this rule in the U.K., the U.S., France, and Italy). 
 42. See Cantiere Savona SRL, STARSUP, http://www.starsup.it/project/cantiere-savona-srl/ (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
 43. Observation made from checking the website regularly. 
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example, the sophisticated investors were the last to invest; hence, they did 
not generate information for others and instead just approved a project 
ready to launch. 
Finally, the previous discussion assumes that investors are generally 
fully rational; however, behavioral economic studies have shown that 
investors do not always behave entirely rationally.44  They may suffer from 
overconfidence when they put too much stock in the information they 
derived.45  One such issue can arise when crowd members see other 
investors with private information about the project invest and fail to 
realize that other reasons besides profit making (e.g., love) can lead to 
investing.  Crowd investors could believe that other individuals have better 
information than they do and crowd investors could over rely on the 
crowd's investment behavior more than they really should. 
Overfunding can also induce even more overconfidence: crowd 
investor can interpret overfunding to mean that a project is more successful 
than the fundraiser believed it would be.  Overfunding can aggravate some 
of the all-or-nothing model flaws.  The next section investigates in more 
details overfunding within the context of the all-or-nothing model. 
 
III.  OVERFUNDING ENCOURAGES HERDING AND FURTHER 
DISTORTS INCENTIVES 
 
Overfunding occurs when a campaign creator allows the crowd to 
invest beyond the preset threshold and the crowd keeps investing.  
Overfunding frequently occurs. 
 
In the reward-based setting, one study found that in over 40,000 
Kickstarter projects created between 2009 and July 2012, the projects that 
were successfully funded were also on average funded at 152% of their 
 
 44. Behavioral economics has showed that investment behavior may suffer from a number of 
belief distortions.  Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in Handbook 
of the Economics of Fin. (G.M. Constantinides et al., eds. 2003) http://faculty.som.yale.edu/nichola 
sbarberis/ch18_6.pdf (suggesting overconfidence, optimism and wishful thinking, representatives, 
conservatism, belief perseverance, anchoring, and availability biases as potential belief disruptors that 
can affect investor decisions); at 1064 (stating that optimism and wishful thinking occurs when 
investors overestimate their investment abilities); (representativeness occurs when investors misidentify 
characteristics and associations and investors make generalization); at 1065 (conservatism occurs when 
investors underestimate the occurrence of a hypothesis based on an observed event); at 1066 (belief 
perseverance occurs when investors cling on too long to a belief); (anchoring occurs when an investor’s 
initial belief affects future belief); (availability biases occur when investor's more recent experiences 
overly affect his belief).   
 45. Overconfidence occurs when investors “believe that they have information strong enough to 
justify a trade, whereas in fact the information is too weak to warrant any action.”  2 ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL FIN. 53 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005).  
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threshold goals, overfunded by 51.9%.46 
In the equity based setting, from data collected on CrowdCube, 
successful equity crowdfunding campaigns in 2014, were funded at 140% 
of the target threshold.47  
Allowing overfunding creates a two-fold problem when deployed with 
the all-or-nothing model.  This section investigates the issues that 
overfunding creates for the crowd and how campaign creators can take 
advantage of overfunding. 
 
A.  THE CROWD HAS A LOWER INCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATE 
 
Investors incorporate in their decision making process the number of 
previous investors, the level of investments made, and remaining 
investments needed to reach the threshold.  Empirical studies have found 
that the ratio of investments made to the goal, strongly influences the 
decision process of investors.48  Furthermore, observing overfunding tends 
to trigger even more funding than underfunding.49 
Subsequent investors take into consideration the funding level for two 
reasons.  First, they trust that the critical mass that came before them has 
performed their due diligence before investing.  Overfunding discourages 
information gathering.  Crowd members who are uninformed and unwilling 
to inform themselves herd around projects that have already garnered 
enough support.50  Second, they are assured that the project will become 
funded; hence, investing in overfunded projects removes any lingering 
doubt about the project's outcome and spares the investors the search cost 
of looking for an alternative investment. 
Herding is privately efficient, but it creates problems.  First, herding 
around a few projects leaves fewer resources for other projects, which may  
 
remain unfunded.  Therefore, overfunding furthers inequality between 
projects and project creators.51 
 
 46. Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 
1, tbl. 1 (2014). 
 47. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 407 Table 5. 
 48. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 37. 
 49. Lars Hornuf & Armin Schwienbacher, Funding Dynamics in Crowdinvesting (Working Paper, 
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2612998 (testing the effect of overfunding on the investment incentive 
in crowd-investment in Germany and finding that “[c]ompared to pre-funding, the number of 
investments is 2.23 percent larger in the postfunding period”). 
 50. Agrawal et al., supra note 32 (stating that “[f]unding propensity increases with accumulated 
capital and may lead to herding.”).  In Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets, 79 
ECONOMETRICA 973 (2011), Andreas Park & Hamid Sabourian model sequential investment model and 
describe the circumstances under which investors herding. 
 51. Initial investments usually come from friends and family.  Since the projects that reach their 
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Second, overfunding takes the project control away from the 
campaign creator.  For reward based crowdfunding, one study found that 
overfunded projects are more likely to experience delayed deliveries.52  
Delays with overfunding can be explained in two ways.  First, the project 
funder allowed for overfunding and did not accurately anticipate the 
demand; hence, since the realized demand exceeds the expected supply, the 
delivery takes longer than expected.  Second, overfunding encourages 
campaign creators to ex-ante ask for less than they need.  If they cannot 
reach sufficient economies of scale to fulfill the demand, then they may 
need to find complementary funds whose search delays the project and 
increases the cost.53 
 
B.  CAMPAIGN CREATORS MISINFORMATION STRATEGY 
 
Campaign creators can game the system to induce more investment.  
Instead of selecting the level of investment they want, they can set their 
threshold lower.  Specifically, campaign creators have a private incentive 
to select an amount they believe can be collected easily, which then will 
further induce uneducated investors to follow others. 
In other words, the campaign creator may distort the information 
provided by the would-be investment level: investors cannot trust how 
much a company requests under overfunding.  This creates two problems. 
First, empirical studies show that investors are not only affected by the 
percentage of the goal reached but also by the actual amount required.54  
Since the campaign creator under-asks for funds to assure that he reaches 
the threshold and encourages further funding through overfunding, he may 
end up with less than he needs to succeed.  Collecting less than he needs 
increases his chances of failure.  Alternatively, he may elect to complement 
the initial crowdfunding campaign. 
 
 
He can complement his campaign by a loan or a subsequent 
campaign.55  For reward-based campaigns, seeking a loan or a subsequent 
 
goal garner more interest, the seed funds from friends and family will perpetuate the initial inequality of 
project creators: project creators who come from poor background will have poorer friends and family 
who may not be able to put the seed money sufficient to garner other individual attention; instead, few 
projects herd these funds that are not linked to a project.  
 52. Mollick, supra note 46, at 12–13. 
 53. In traditional market, a high demand implies that the company can charge higher prices for the 
product to the point that supply meets demand; instead, in crowdfunding with overfunding, the whole 
demand is affected and, since the prices are set, the cost is carried by the campaign creator, who ends up 
losing money. 
 54. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 37. 
 55. Ethan R. Mollick & Venkat Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding 
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campaign can retard the delivery of goods for the initial reward based 
campaign. 
In the equity context, overfunding does not allow investors to form an 
accurate belief.  Loans decrease the future earning potential of the initial 
investment because the fundraiser will have to repay the interest whereas 
the initial funds raised were provided interest free.  A subsequent campaign 
can further put investors at risk56 because it can dilute the investors' 
shares.57  Under certain regulations, like in the U.S., crowd investors are 
locked into their investment for 12 months and may not be able to avoid 
dilution by reselling their investment or by negotiating antidilution 
clauses.58 
Finally, in equity crowdfunding, the crowd cannot accurately 
anticipate the level of the agency problem59 because overfunding creates 
uncertainties and, hence, unclear rules.  While the agency problem cannot 
be avoided,60 potential investors cannot estimate the campaign creator’s 
remaining level of incentive.61 
Overfunding compounds the information asymmetries of investing 
into new companies or new projects.  When an investor considers making a 
contribution, he or she forms beliefs about the projects.  Since investors 
 
(UNC Kenan-Flagler Research, Paper No. 2376997, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2376997 (finding that the majority of campaign creator in Kickstarter sample ended up 
complementing their campaign by raising further funds from other sources including from following up 
campaign). 
 56. Edmund W. Kitch compares investing in securities regulation to gambling and calls for the 
government to become consistent about its regulations: “If governments are . . .  fine . . . [with] citizen   
. . . gambling, does it make sense to try to prevent them from investing . . . and assuming the risk that 
their investment is an unprofitable one?  Application of the securities acts needs to adapt to modern 
technologies and contemporary views.”  Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding and an Innovator’s Access 
to Capital, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 889 (2014). 
 57. See, e.g., John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, 
and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 618 (2013) 
(discussion the issues of dilution as it relates to crowdfunding and arguing that “crowdfunders, like 
venture capitalists, need down-round antidilution protection against the horizontal risks that subsequent 
investors represent” and “need standard contractual protection against shares-based dilution”). 
 58. If crowdfunding works, as intended, at providing seed fund to start-ups, then investors should 
expect some dilution; but, contrary to traditional investors, like business angels or venture capital funds, 
crowd investors may not be able to negotiate for antidilution clauses.  Id. 
 59. The agency problem occurs because the manager/founder of the company does not receive the 
whole benefits of his work.  Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the issues associated with separating control, which 
makes the decision, from ownership, which bears the consequences of decisions because transaction 
costs lead to incomplete contracts). 
 60. It can, however, be addressed by realigning the incentive of the founders with the investors. 
 For instance, the founder may receive performance incentives (i.e., his salary may be attached to the 
companies' returns). 
 61. For instance, the campaign creator can offer twenty percent of the company to the crowd for 
$500,000  the original threshold, but also set an overfunding threshold of forty percent of the 
company for $1,000,000 (assuming no dilution).  If the founder holds eighty percent or sixty percent of 
the company, he has a different incentive to work at the margin. 
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may not have access to facts such as whether overfunding is possible and 
its level, their beliefs will become inaccurate.  Overfunding is not an option 
in traditional Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”). 
In general, overfunding places the risk of underfunding on the 
committed investors, whereas, without overfunding the risk is on the 
campaign creator.  Without overfunding, campaign creators may end up 
being more forthcoming about what they need.  They still have an incentive 
to set the threshold to what they think they can reach, but since they know 
that over-funding is not possible, these thresholds ought to be more 
reflective of what they need. 
This is not to say that overfunding should not be allowed, because it 
serves a purpose.  For instance, in Italy, the regulations allows investors to 
change their mind until the threshold is reached within limits;62 some level 
of overfunding may be necessary to protect ventures and entrepreneurs 
from investor indecisiveness. 
Overfunding should, however, be capped, and more importantly be 
fully disclosed.  The amounts (capitalization, amount, etc.) they disclose 
are important information.  Without disclosure, investors will be misled. 
Alternatively, a way to shift the risk back on the campaign creator is 
to allow a cool-off period for investors: a period after the closing of the 
fundraising but before they are bound by their commitment.63  Unlike an 
IPO, equity crowdfunding allows for overfunding.  Investors should be able 
to change their mind if they think that the entrepreneurs will keep ninety 
percent of the equity but because of overfunding, it gets reduced to eighty 
percent.64 
 
IV.  REALIGNING INCENTIVES 
 
The all-or-nothing model has drawbacks.  The level of due diligence is 
arguably less than optimal.  Participants have diverging incentives to seek 
or hide information.  This section examines how these crowdfunding  
 
participants can be encouraged to realign their private incentives with the 
optimal level of due diligence. 
 
 
 62. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 391. 
 63. For instance the Italian regulation allows investors to withdraw their order within seven days of 
ordering or within seven days of having knowledge of a material mistake that would “influence the 
decision on the investment.”  CONSOB Regolamento n. 18592/2013, art. 13 § 5 & 25 § 2 (June 26, 
2013) (It.).  Overfunding could constitute such material mistake. 
 64. The same argument could be made for reward crowdfunding: letting overfunding occur can 
change the delivery delay (because of miss-calibration) and hence the crowds desire to participate. 
  
506 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 12:3 
A.  ONLY SOME PLATFORMS ARE HELD LEGALLY LIABLE 
 
Crowdfunding portals have private incentives to filter bad and 
fraudulent projects.  Crowdfunding platforms can also be further 
incentivized to filter projects by holding them vicariously liable for the 
misconduct their platforms enable.  Little jurisprudence exists specific to 
crowdfunding.  As such, this section looks at platform liability in other 
context and draws comparisons. 
Crowdfunding is a nascent phenomenon and courts have not ruled on 
their liability, but they offer similar services as eBay with auctioned goods, 
Napster with music files, Airbnb with vacation rentals, and even Uber with 
transportation.  These other platforms offer a glimpse into platform 
liabilities that can help guide crowdfunding platforms.  First, this section 
looks at reward-based crowdfunding and second it looks at equity-based 
crowdfunding. 
 
1.  Reward Based Crowdfunding 
 
In most cases, reward based crowdfunding platforms should not be 
held liable because crowdfunding platforms only offer a forum where 
campaign creators meet the crowd.  They do not endorse any actions or 
messages they enable through their forum.  They do not make product 
guarantees nor do they advise the crowd on which project to fund.  They 
allow the two sides to transact. 
eBay is a platform where individuals can “display” and sell their 
unwanted goods to other platform users.  eBay was one of the first to  
litigate this issue of platform liability in the internet context.65  In Gentry v. 
eBay,66 the plaintiff purchased memorabilia through eBay.  The 
memorabilia turned out to be fake and the plaintiff sued eBay alleging that 
eBay was in breach of the California’s Autographed Sports Memorabilia 
Statute67 and engaged in unfair business practices under the Unfair 
Competition Law.68  The court ruled that eBay is not a sports memorabilia 
dealer because it does not control how goods are classified and described 
and hence the California's Autographed Sports Memorabilia Statute does 
not apply.69  Furthermore, the appellate court also held that Section 230 of 
 
 65. For instance, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 105 (2nd Cir. 2010) discusses that this 
Court was the first to apply contributory trademark infringement to an online marketplace and discusses 
cases overseas. 
 66. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816 (2002). 
 67. Cal. Civ. Code § 1739.7 (West 2000). 
 68. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210. 
 69. Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 826–28.    
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Title 47 of the United States Code immunizes eBay because the content of 
the description was provided by the seller  a third party to eBay  and 
thus eBay did not directly publish the information and hence did not cause 
the harm70  which barred the Unfair Competition Law claim as well.71 
As eBay's success continued to grow, it continued to tract the sale of 
counterfeits.  In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,72 the court describes the pro-
active and retroactive measures that eBay has put in place to filter out 
counterfeits.  Tiffany jewelers alleged that eBay infringed its trademark,73 
that eBay contributed its trademark infringement,74 and that eBay was 
willfully blind and was not incentivized to filter out counterfeits,75  among 
others allegations.  The Second Circuit Court dismissed all three claims 
against eBay citing eBay’s effort to filter counterfeits ex-ante and ex-post 
auction.  The Court’s discussion focuses on the difference between eBay's 
general knowledge of fraudulent activity and specific knowledge76: General 
knowledge is not sufficient to hold the platform liable; instead, they must 
have specific knowledge and have failed to act. 
Beyond the exchange of tangible goods, other forums have facilitated 
the exchange of intangible goods.  Napster did for copyrighted materials 
what eBay did for counterfeit products: They allowed peer-to-peer 
exchange of products.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a Napster like 
application in 2005 in the case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd.77  In this case, the Court ruled that a peer-to-peer software 
designer was liable for enabling and encouraging the transfer of 
copyrighted material.78  The Court distinguished this case from the previous 
landmark ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.79 
because even though both technologies allowed for the infringement of 
copyrighted material, Grokster made infringement the objective of the 
technology, which could be demonstrated through statements.80  Since this 
decision, legal applications of these principles have seen platforms like 
YouTube81 evade liability because they performed ex-post enforcement 
when copyrighted media was flagged as infringing. 
These two examples show that some crowdfunding portals will be 
 
 70. Id. at 828–30.  
 71. Id. at 835–36. 
 72. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 93. 
 73. Id. at 101–03. 
 74. Id. at 103–09. 
 75. Id. at 109–10 
 76. Id. at 107. 
 77. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 78. Id. at 940. 
 79. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 80. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.,  545 U.S. at 941. 
 81. Viacom Intern. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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able to avoid liability.  First, most reward based platforms amount to a 
presale: the project creators sell products that do not exist yet and promise 
to send them in the future.  Therefore, such platforms can avoid liability for 
the information posted by campaign creators.  Second, if the platforms ex-
post ban fraudulent projects after the crowd polices and flags a project, then 
they can avoid liability under certain circumstances.  Reward based 
platforms like Kickstarter that perform ex-post enforcement and rely on the 
crowd to monitor projects may well be doing just enough to avoid 
liability.82 
In the discussed cases, the courts were not swayed by the level of 
fraud, but simply by the platforms' actions.83  In the past, Kickstarter has 
witnessed even lower levels of fraud.84  While not a factor for courts, 
Kickstarter will unlikely face liability because it has put in place sufficient 
filters to either deter or fight frauds. 
 
2.  Equity Crowdfunding 
 
Platforms can face different problems if they facilitate the exchange of 
regulated products or services.  Some platforms have come under heavy 
criticism because they facilitate peer-to-peer transactions in heavily 
regulated industries and step on the toes of brick and mortar regulated 
businesses.  Equity crowdfunding platforms also facilitate the trading of 
regulated products and looking at court decisions in other contexts may 
help draw a comparison. 
First, Airbnb85 acts as a forum that enables peer-to-peer property 
rentals for short or long-term stays.  In the case of Airbnb, housing rentals 
must comply with various zoning laws, tax regulations, and other local 
 
 82. Kickstarter denies liability for fraud or bad performing schemes.  Trust and Safety, 
KICKSTARTER,  https://www.kickstarter.com/trust (explaining Kickstarter’s policy and level of 
availability, and what actions it takes in case of complaints).  Kickstarter Transparency Report 2014, 
KICKSTARTER,  https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/kickstarter-transparency-report-2014 (explaining the 
actions taken in consequence to complaint about intellectual property right infringements). 
 83. Andrés Guadamuz González claims “four out of every ten buyers reporting that they have had 
some sort of problem with their transactions.”  Andrés Guadamuz González, eBay Law: The Legal 
Implications of the C2C Electronic Commerce Model, 19 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 468, 469 
(2003).  In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. the defendant claims that over seventy-three percent of alleged Tiffany 
products are counterfeit. 600 F.3d at 99.  In Grokster, Justice Breyer cites that ninety percent of the 
Grokster traffic may involve copyright infringement issues and the same could be said in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); yet, the defendant in the former was held 
liable while in the latter, it was not.  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 951.  These examples show that the level of 
fraudulent activities is not the issue; the issue revolves around the actions undertaken to stop the frauds. 
 84. In a sample of 381 Kickstarter products, three issued refunds and eleven stopped responding to 
backers: 3.6% of the projects were incomplete. Mollick Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of 
Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 11 (2014). 
 85. AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
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ordinances.  Their enforcement has been directed toward platform users 
and not the platform itself.  For instance, in San Francisco, the local 
authorities have legislated the duration during which a property can be 
rented;86 while it indirectly affects Airbnb, the local ordinance does not 
regulate the platform itself.  In New York, the authorities have been trying 
to clamp down on the hotel tax evasion that Airbnb enables.87  Airbnb itself 
has not been held liable either and instead the platform makes sure to 
inform users that it does not hold liability.88 
Second, Uber89 is a platform enabling the peer-to-peer transport of 
individuals.  Uber has not been as successful as Airbnb90 at deflecting 
liability.  Uber is being challenged by the drivers using the platform to 
prove that they are not independent contractors, but instead they were 
employees of Uber.91  As such, Uber would be vicariously liable for the 
actions of the platform users.92 
These two examples of peer-to-peer interactions involving regulated 
services demonstrate that liability depends on old regulations applied to 
new market places.  In the equity context, the sale of equity shares is 
heavily regulated.  Contrary to other previously discussed platforms, U.S. 
regulators have carved specific rules for equity crowdfunding platforms 
and hold platforms liable for checking into the campaign creator's 
background, etc.93 
These rules will likely function in the digital world as they do in the 
 
 86. Katy Steinmetz, San Francisco Revamps Airbnb Regulations, TIME  (July 15, 2015), http://ti 
me.com/3958153/san-francisco-airbnb-legislation/.  
 87. Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 44 Misc. 3d 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (denying a motion to 
squash a state general attorney subpoena order against Airbnb where the attorney general attempts to 
obtain information about Airbnb users in an attempt to enforce the Multiple Dwelling Laws). 
 88. See, e.g., Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 149 (2015) (discussing the various disclaimers and the lack of liability for Airbnb and stating 
that Airbnb avoids liability under § 230). 
 89. UBER, https://www.uber.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).   
 90. Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ARTS 329, 335 (2014) (arguing that Airbnb avoid liability by behaving like a travel agent). 
 91. In O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., platform users have brought a class action against 
Uber because Uber failed to pass on the gratuity that they were allegedly supposed to receive.  No. C-
13-3826 EMC (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Uber argues the drivers are not its employees but instead are 
independent contractors and therefore not entitled to guarantees that employees receive in California. 
 The District Court ruled that Uber's drivers are its presumptive employees but questions of facts remain 
to be determined as to whether they are employees.  Uber faces similar claims and class action for 
platform users from Massachusetts and Illinois respectively in Yucesoy v. Uber Technologuies, Inc., No. 
4:15-cv-00262-EMC (N.D. Cal. 2015) and Ehret v. Uber, Technologies, Inc., No. 14-cv-0113-EMC 
 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Some have expressed doubt about the validity of this argument.  See e.g., Brishen 
Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 82, 98–99 (2015) (stating that the 
author is “skeptical, though, that many courts will find Uber drivers to be employees” because most 
federal and state statutes require the employer to have “the right to control” and Uber fails to control the 
drivers' working hours). 
 92. Search v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Civil No. 15-257 (JEB) (DDC 2015). 
 93. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389. 
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analog world.  Equity crowdfunding platforms act as IPO underwriters 
because they publish the information necessary to sell shares publicly.  
Underwriting a public offering exposes the underwriter to strict liability, 
but allegedly liable underwriters can invoke a due diligence defense if 
sued.94  Therefore, equity platforms are likely to follow the same rules95  
regardless of their online existence  and Section 230 will not immunize 
equity crowdfunding platforms if the campaign creator posts misleading 
statements. 
 
3.  Realigning Incentives 
 
Not all forms of crowdfunding are equal and as such, realigning 
incentives depends upon the nature of the platforms.  The platforms' 
incentives are the least misaligned of the three crowdfunding participants. 
For reward based crowdfunding, it remains too early to say whether 
reward crowdfunding projects will involve the same level of fraud as 
eBay96 and therefore even require realigning platform incentives to 
optimally filter projects.  Even if reward crowdfunding platforms do not 
filter projects ex-ante, not filtering them ex-post exposes them to enough 
liability to incentivize them to perform some due diligence according to the 
existing negligence standards discussed above in other platform contexts. 
For equity based crowdfunding, platforms have sufficient private and 
legal incentives to assure that they filter projects; they sometimes have too 
much incentive to filter projects.97  Fraud may not be the biggest threat to 
crowdfunding; it may be project creators’ incompetence.  Platforms face no 
liability if the information disclosed is not misleading, but the projects they 
post on their website fail due to project creator’s incompetence.  With new 
companies, seventy percent of startups fail within five years of their 
creation.98  The example of WiSeed in France tends to show that 
crowdfunded equity projects fail at a similar or higher rate.99  Professional 
investors would know this but the crowd may not and hence they could be 
 
 94. The 1933 Act states that “no person, other than the issuer, shall be liable” unless the issuer can 
prove that “he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe” at the time of the 
statements that they were true without material fact omissions or misleading statements.  15 U.S.C. § 
77k(b)(3)(A); Joseph Kieran Leahy, The Irrepressible Myths of BarChris, 37 DJCL 411, 421–25 (2012) 
(describing the underwriter's liability and what underwriters have done in order to avoid such liability 
and satisfy due diligence). 
 95. To further protect investors, France regulators have required that these platforms have a civil 
insurance in order to be able to pay if they are held liable.  Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 396.   
 96. See supra notes 69–70. 
 97. See infra Section IV.C. 
 98. Garry A. Gabison, Birth, Survival, Growth, and Death of ICT Companies, JRC SCIENTIFIC & 
POL’Y REPORT, EUR Rep 27127 (2015). 
 99. Lejoux, supra note 14. 
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exposed to risks they do not appreciate. 
Platforms as underwriter100 play an important role but they may be 
doing too little to assure that equity crowdfunding will not fail.  
Crowdfunding platforms could be incentivized to filter projects for 
incompetence through liability (using a gross negligence standard for 
instance)101 which would lead to a minimum amount of filtering.  Such 
liability could, however, carry a heavy price: Platforms will end up filtering 
projects the same way as other professional investors do and lose some of 
the unseen benefits of having the crowd involved who can select and 
support projects that traditional investors do not find viable. 
 
B.  EQUITY FUNDRAISERS SHOULD DISCLOSE PAST PERFORMANCE  
WITHIN LIMITS 
 
In the online world, peer-to-peer trust relies on reputation based on 
feedback from repeated interactions.102  Following each interaction, peers 
rate others peer contributions and with each interaction, peers gain status.103  
Reputation on a given website may take the form of ratings.  In the 
crowdfunding context, campaign creators rarely repeatedly interact with 
investors like an eBay seller would with purchasers.104  As such, these 
ratings have not yet surfaced in the crowdfunding context.105  Relying on 
informal means of enforcement may not work in the crowdfunding context. 
Campaign creators are legally liable for the information they disclose 
on a website.  If they intend to defraud platform users, realigning their 
incentive requires increasing the enforcement level.  The enforcement level 
 
 100. Blakley C. Davis and Justin W. Webb argue that the “relationships with underwriters and/or 
strategic alliances with established firms can also reduce the liabilities stemming from newness by 
enabling the venture to essentially borrow legitimacy from the external party.”  Blakley C. Davis & 
Justin W. Webb, Crowd-Funding of Entrepreneurial Ventures: Getting the Right Combination of 
Signals, 32 FRONTIERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP RES. 1, 5 (2012).  Javier Ramos, Crowdfunding and the 
Role of Managers in Ensuring the Sustainability of Crowdfunding Platforms, JRC SCIENTIFIC & POL’Y 
REPORT 46 (2014) (discussing the role that platform managers can play to prevent fraud). 
 101. Unlike Uber, who may face liability for negligent hiring, platforms do not face liability for 
negligent posting and do not filter projects for incompetence.  A similar standard could be applied to 
equity crowdfunding. 
 102. Dara Chevlin, Schemes and Scams: Auction Fraud and the Culpability of Host Auction Web 
Sites, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 223, 230 (2005) (discussing the importance of  feedback about 
online participant but warns that this feedback is not always reliable). 
 103. Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 835 (discussing the rating of platform users and finding that 
platforms are not liable for the rating because they are highly subjective). 
 104. For instance, Kickstarter states that twelve percent of campaign creators have launched more 
than one project; leaving eighty-eight percent without repeat interactions.  KICKSTARTER, https://www. 
kickstarter.com/blog/by-the-numbers-when-creators-return-to-kickstarter (last visited Oct. 27, 2015). 
 105. Note that if platforms create a rating for campaign creators, they are opening themselves up to 
liabilities under Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969) because it could amount to an 
endorsement (to be distinguished from Yanase v. Automobile Club of So. Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 468 
(1989), where such endorsement was not offered). 
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depends on the monitoring, prosecution, and damage levels.  Damages 
include punitive damages and civil and criminal penalties.  If defrauding 
campaign creators are held to a higher degree, their actions will be better 
deterred, however, campaign creators who intend to defraud the crowd may 
well be judgment proof and not respond to higher punishments.  Holding 
them accountable more often may be the only recourse. 
One way to assure that crowdfunding does not attract fraudulent 
schemes is by requiring fundraisers to exhibit costly signals that only non-
fraudulent schemes can exhibit.106  In the equity context, these signals 
usually take the form of filings or disclosure requirements.  The U.S. 
regulation requires107 such a signal, but has been criticized for the cost it 
imposes on the system.108   
These past performances or the company's health are assumed to be 
predictive of future performances, yet, past performances can be a poor 
predictor of future results.  Even if the campaign creator puts good faith 
effort into the startup, they might fail.  Nonetheless, some measures can be 
put in places to assure that campaign creators carry some liability to ensure 
they do put good faith effort into the company. 
To ensure such efforts, their incentives must not be completely 
misaligned.  First, the campaign creator should always remain the majority 
equity holder109 to diminish the potential impact of the agency problem.  
Aware of this issue, some platforms cap how much equity a campaign can 
offer.110 
 
Second, platforms can further incentivize fundraisers by divesting the 
funds in installments after certain milestones (e.g., prototype, mass 
production, etc.).  This tool has been heavily used in the venture capital 
 
 106. Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Kato, Dividing online and offline: A case study, 74 REV. ECON. 
STUDIES 981 (2007) (modelling and testing the sale of trading cards over the internet and discussing 
and testing the usefulness of grading service  auditing like services for trading cards  to separate 
good from bad products). 
 107. Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 389. 
 108. “The proposed S.E.C. rules, particularly those requiring audited financials and annual 
reporting, have been criticized as detrimental to crowdfunding because compliance costs have been 
estimated to consume more than 15 percent of the offering.  The result is that few expect the S.E.C. to 
adopt regulations that allow companies to use crowdfunding effectively.”  Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://deal 
book.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-it-2/?_r=0. 
 109. As previously discussed in note 46, the agency problem occurs when separating ownership 
from management.  By requiring that the campaign creators have a minimum amount of equity or 
interest in the company, it supports that they will self-serve and try to advance their interest by putting a 
good faith effort. 
 110. For instance, WiSeed limits the capital sale up to twenty percent.  WISEED (Mar. 24, 2016), 
https:// www.wiseed.com/en/startups/lever-des-fonds. 
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context.111  To some extent, all regulations have addressed this question 
because they limit the amount entrepreneurs can raise.112 
Third, the campaign creator could also sign a noncompete agreement 
to assure that he will not jump ship at the first sign of failure.  If the 
entrepreneur knows that his future is tied to the company for the 
foreseeable future, he will be more incentivized to give its all for the 
company. 
 
C.  ENCOURAGING A WISER CROWD IN EQUITY CROWDFUNDING 
 
Crowdfunding presents the crowd with unique investment 
opportunities; but crowdfunding is not without issues.  This section 
discusses how some of these issues can be addressed. 
 
1.  Moral Hazard Problems 
 
The crowd likely under-invests in due diligence for five reasons.  
First, the crowd may not carry out any due diligence because they lack the 
expertise to understand financial reports113 and must rely on outside due 
diligence (i.e., platforms); thus, the crowd will not invest into information it 
cannot understand.  Second, even if they have the expertise, they can free 
ride upon the due diligence of others114  including platforms, whose 
livelihood depends on properly filtering these projects.115  Third, if they 
have the expertise, the small size of a crowdfunding investments may not 
justify the cost of performing this due diligence.116  Fourth, the crowd 
 
 111. Staged financing has been heavily used in the venture capital context and could help keep the 
campaign creator's incentives aligned with the investing crowd's incentives.  Paul Alan Gompers & 
Joshua Lerner, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE, Ch. 8 (2004) (discussing stage financing in the context 
of venture capital).  Furthermore, stage financing can limit the impact of bad projects since campaign 
creators would not receive the funds if they cannot reach the next stage and hence limiting the amount 
that can be defrauded or lost to incompetent entrepreneurs. 
 112. Some policymakers have even complained that these limits were too small and talked of 
increasing them already.  Chance Barnett, SEC To Vote On Title III Equity Crowdfunding Rulings 
October 30th, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2015, 8:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/ 
10/27/sec-to-vote-on-title-iii-equity-crowdfunding-rulings-october-30th/. 
 113. Nonrational investors may even overestimate their investment abilities.  See Barberis & Thaler, 
supra note 44, at 1064. 
 114. “To the extent that the cost of performing due diligence is high and the individual benefit low, 
the crowdfunding community may systematically underinvest in due diligence; instead, funders may 
free-ride on the investment decisions of others, which is feasible to do since funding information is 
public and funders usually cannot be excluded.”  Agrawal et al., supra note 40. 
 115. See, e.g., Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045 (1990) (modeling the impact of underwriter reputations on stock prices 
following an IPO; finding that the stock of companies whose IPO was underwritten by financial 
companies with a higher reputation did not experience price run-ups; and concluding that prestigious 
underwriters associated with lower risks and provide investors less incentive to acquire information). 
 116. Id. 
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investors can diversify and protect against risks.  Finally, investors may be 
too protected to incentivize their due diligence.  When other crowdfunding 
participants carry the liability, investors may fall into a moral hazard trap117 
 they could invest without performing their due diligence because the 
liabilities of other participants assure that they can recover. 
When the platform has a (legal) duty to filter projects, the crowd 
seems to be less skeptical of the projects.  In Europe, crowdfunding 
platform comparisons provide some evidence that different liability 
schemes lead to differing crowd behavior.  In France, Ulule, a Paris-based 
reward crowdfunding platform, quotes a success rate of sixty-five 
percent.118  As a reward based crowdfunding platform, Ulule denies all 
liability with respect to failed projects;119 yet, “Ulule performs an initial 
validation when a project is proposed to filter out questionable projects.”120  
Also in France, WiSeed, a Toulouse-based equity crowdfunding platform, 
which has a three-layer filtering process, quotes a ninety-four percent 
success rate after the projects go through the filtering.121  WiSeed, as a 
Conseiller en Investissements Participatifs, or licensed crowdfunding 
agent, carries a duty to perform a due diligence and to audit the projects.  In 
the U.K. in 2013, Crowdfunder, a U.K. based reward crowdfunding 
platform, reported a twenty-three percent success rate,122 whereas, in 2014, 
Crowdcube, its sister equity crowdfunding platform, quoted a fifty-two 
percent success rate.123  Similarly, Crowdfunder denies any liability124 
whereas Crowdcube is a licensed professional. 
Platform comparisons in France and in the UK show that reward 
based crowdfunding traditionally has a lower success rate than equity based 
crowdfunding.  A number of factors may explain this difference including 
the size and nature of the investment.  However, liability divergences also 
 
 117. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. 941 (1963) (explaining that individuals take more risks when they carry insurance because others 
will pay the costs of their risky activity). 
 118. Ulule Statistics, ULULE, https://www.ulule.com/stats/ (retrieved Oct. 26, 2015), https://web.arc 
hive.org/web/20160214231539/http://www.ulule.com/stats/.   
 119. “Consequently, Ululers may not seek the Company's liability if Project Owners fail to meet 
their obligations.”  General Conditions of Use for the Site, ULULE,  https://www.ulule.com/about/terms/ 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
 120. FAQ, ULULE, http://www.ulule.com/about/faq/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
 121. See Startups Funded per Year, supra note 15. 
 122. Grants, loans and crowdfunding  the new funding mix, CROWDFUNDER, http://www.crowd 
funder.co.uk/uploads/biz_dev/special_report_grants_loans_crowdfunding.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 
2015). 
 123. Crowdcube Infographic, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/infographic (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2015). 
 124. Crowdcube Terms of Use, CROWDCUBE, http://www.crowdfunder.co.uk/terms-conditions (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
  
Spring 2016 ALL-OR-NOTHING CROWDFUNDING MODEL 515 
need to be considered.125  In equity crowdfunding, the crowd relies on 
filters provided by other crowdfunding participants and do not act 
according to the expected principles of the Wisdom of the Crowd; in reward 
crowdfunding, the crowd carries the liability.126 
Two caveats should be made.  First, individual investors may not have 
sufficient incentive to enforce their rights through complicated litigation 
because they invest only small amounts and coordination costs are high.127  
Instead, they must rely on the regulator to enforce their rights against 
platforms and campaign creators. 
Second, having platforms bear liability and heavily filter projects 
could lead to better outcomes (e.g., lower failure rate) than letting the 
crowd filter projects because platforms employ experienced financial 
professionals.  The counterfactual (whether more platform liability leads to 
worse outcome) cannot be properly tested.128  However, having too many 
platform based filters arguably deprives society of a number of socially 
valuable ideas: professional platforms filter projects in a different way than 
the crowd and these professionals may not find a project viable that the 
crowd may have supported. 
 
 2.  A Role for Policymakers and Platforms 
 
Policymakers (and platforms) have attempted to realign the crowd's 
incentives.  Policymakers, like Italian policymakers,129 have required that 
all investors should be offered a cool-off period before the investment 
becomes final.  Having a period where the investors can only further 
investigate and remove his investment (instead of investing) will allow 
investors to focus on the information instead of investing out of fear of 
missing out.130 
Besides providing time to reflect, some platforms provided potential 
 
 125. Comparing country to country may be difficult because of the size of the sites.  Ulule performs 
an initial validation that Crowdfunder does not.  Similarly, WiSeed has a three-layer filtering process 
that Crowdcube does not deploy and hence filters out more projects; Crowdcube helped fund one 
hundred and five projects in 2014 compared to thirteen for WiSeed.  2014 Review, CROWDCUBE, 
http://www.crowdcube. com/2014/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).  
 126. If platforms (and campaigners) are not held liable, investors carry the risks directly. 
 127. The small amounts invested through crowdfunding do not provide individual investors with 
enough private incentive to sue to enforce their rights when they must pay large litigation costs to 
enforce these rights. 
 128. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the Peltzman effect, which is the effect of having 
more safety regulations which lead to more risk taking and worse outcomes.  See generally Sam 
Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975).  
 129. See CONSOB Reg. n. 18592/2013, supra note 63. 
 130. Hornuf & Schwienbacher, supra note 49 (observing “a small rise in investments during the last 
three days of the funding period,” an effect that might be due to some investors closely watching the 
funding dynamics and ultimately fearing that they will no longer be able to invest). 
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investors with warnings.  For instance, Crowdcube provides the following 
warning: 
 
Investing in start-ups and early stage businesses involves 
risks, including illiquidity, lack of dividends, loss of 
investment and dilution, and it should be done only as part of 
a diversified portfolio.  Crowdcube is targeted exclusively at 
investors who are sufficiently sophisticated to understand 
these risks and make their own investment decisions.  You 
will only be able to invest via Crowdcube once you are 
registered as sufficiently sophisticated.131 
 
Platforms put these warning to protect themselves against liability and 
therefore, investors assume the risks of investing.  The positive externality 
is that these warnings help inform the crowd about the risks of investing; 
however, these warnings remain vague and are relegated to the bottom of 
the page.  Further warnings can be read on the site but they require that the 
visitors actively look for them. 
Whether investors read132 or understand these warnings is difficult to 
tell.  Considering that crowdfunding targets nonsophisticated investors, 
these bottom-of-the-page warnings are arguably insufficient considering 
the risks involved. 
Policymakers should encourage these platforms to use these warnings 
in a more sophisticated way.  First, policymakers can draw from the 
European ePrivacy Directive experience.133  This directive requires that all 
cookies stored on a computer be approved by the user  similar to an opt-
in policy instead of a previously opt-out strategy.134  While the application 
of this directive took different forms in different European Member 
States,135 generally, websites have a tab pop out at the top or bottom of the 
 
 131. Invest in Innovative British Businesses, CROWDCUBE, https://www.crowdcube.com/#risk 
WarningModal (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).  
 132. See e.g., Soussan Djamasbi et al., Visual Hierarchy and Viewing Behavior: An Eye Tracking 
Study, HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION: DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES 331 (2011) 
(discussing the placement of information and reading pattern of website visitors and finding that visitors 
focus on the top, left, and middle of pages and fixate on face images). 
 133. Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 12, 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (directive on privacy and electronic communications) amended by 
2009/136/EC. 
 134. Id.; Council Directive 2009/136 art. 2(5), 2009 O.J. (L337) 11, 30 (EC).  See also Jonathan R. 
Mayer & John C. Mitchell, Third-party Web Tracking: Policy and Technology, 2012 IEEE SYMPOSIUM 
ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 412, 418 (2012). 
 135. Matthew S. Kirsch, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU's Data Protection Framework to Require 
Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Advertising, 18 RICH. JL & TECH. 1, 8 (2011) (providing examples 
of France and the Netherlands to demonstrate different applications of the same EU directive). 
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screen, which offers visitors two or three options: consent, continue 
navigating the website as form of consent, and a direct link to the cookie 
policy.  The warning should be displayed in the same way instead of 
putting them at the bottom of the page. 
Second, platforms can help educate the nonprofessional crowd.  They 
can refuse investment until the potential investors fulfill certain actions.  
They should ensure that the crowd understands the risks involved and the 
platform could benefit from explaining investment risks to non-
professional investors. 
Educating investors can take many forms: It can be passive or active.  
Passive education relies on the investors receiving information.  To ensure 
that these tactics function, platforms can deploy behavioral economic tools 
to help educate nonprofessional investors.  For instance, platform can use 
social norming.136   Through social norming, behavioral economists induce 
individuals to change their behavior by informing them what other 
members of the population are doing i.e., the norm.  Platforms could 
present information about investors within a prompt before they can invest.  
Such a prompt could read: “The average professional investor spends 2hrs 
estimating whereas the average non-professional investor spends less than 
10 minutes.”137  Messages like those could induce the average investors to 
do further due diligence. 
Active education requires investors’ participation.  Before a member 
of the crowd can invest or even before every investment, he could be 
prompted to take a test targeted at providing information.  The prompt 
could test the investor's knowledge about a number of risks associated with 
financial investments.  For instance, a prompt for the failure rate of startups 
could look like: “Within 5 year of its creation, what percentage of startup 
fail?: (a) 30%; (b) 50%; (c) 70%.”138  Avenues of education can include 
due diligence, risk diversity, share dilution, and other concepts that may not 
be obvious to a nonprofessional investor. 
Platforms may not, however, implement this investor filtering of their 
own volition and may require a push.139 Policymakers may provide this 
 
 136. See, e.g., Rene Van Bavel, Gabriele Esposito & Tom Baranowski, Is Anybody Doing It? An 
Experimental Study of the Effect of Normative Messages on Intention to Do Physical Activity, 14 BMC 
PUB. HEALTH 778 (2014) (testing the impact of social norms on the intent of exercise). 
 137. Note that these times in no way reflect estimations. 
 138. If done for every investment, the answers’ order and the wrong answers could be changed at 
every prompt to ensure that the investors do not just always select the same choice but instead read the 
prompts and learn from them. 
 139. In crowdfunding, investments are generally small; hence, platforms need a high volume of 
business  whether through repeat business or economies of scale.  Platforms have a private incentive 
to provide a positive experience: if investors feel that a platform has taken advantage of their lack of 
experience, then visitors will not repeat their interaction and give the platform bad reviews.  Educating 
investors can enhance the experience.  Relying on these incentives and non-regulatory mechanisms has 
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extra push.  Policymakers can protect investors by requiring that they 
become more educated before they invest.140  Policymakers, much like the 
E.U. ePrivacy Directive did, could regulate how much information is 
disclosed and how it is disclosed  including whether overfunding can 
occur as discussed above. 
Policymakers are already regulating a number of crowdfunding 
aspects.  For instance, policymakers in the U.S. and U.K. have limited the 
amount of funds each member of the nonprofessional investing crowd can 
invest.141  These forms of regulations have been described as paternalistic 
regulations.142  Policymakers do not trust the crowd to do what is in their 
best interest and therefore limits their (investment) choices.  Restriction ex-
ante limits the risk to which investors are subjected whereas education 
encourages investors to take educated risk. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Crowdfunding offers an avenue for nontraditional projects and non-
traditional investors.  Harvesting its potential should not come at the 
expense of exposing nonprofessional investors to dangerous behavior. 
Some platforms have already complained that too much regulation 
could harm the process.143  Platforms have some private incentives to 
ensure that investors do not fall to abusive behavior; however, this 
incentive remains limited and regulations have a role to play. 
Campaign creators have little to no private incentive to ensure that 
investors benefits.  While some entrepreneurs become serial entrepreneurs, 
crowdfunding is not old enough to test whether reputational safeguard can 
play a role in this world.  Fraud and incompetence are not crowdfunding 
specific issues: they occurred before crowdfunding existed.144  
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Crowdfunding can, however, facilitate their popularization. 
Investors have private incentives to assure the system works; 
nonetheless, these incentives have limitations.  Even if the investors are 
assumed to be fully rational, they may not perform enough due diligence 
and when they are not fully rational, they may put too much on certain 
pieces of information.  Investors, and particularly non-professional 
investors, suffer from a number of biases145 such as overconfidence about 
the information they gather or about their own ability.  Platforms and 
policymakers have a place to play in curbing these biases. 
Some argue that too many regulations could harm the process more 
than help them.146  However, regulations have spurred investment in some 
occasions because it legitimized the process.147  At what point regulation 
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